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Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road to Social Security Disability: 
Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative Data 
Abstract 
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies can potentially help disability-insured workers stay at 
work or return to work when they experience the onset of a disabling physical or mental 
condition. Such assistance could prevent or delay their exit from the labor force and entry into 
the Social Security disability (SSD) rolls. This study presents new descriptive information on the 
extent to which VR applicants receive SSD benefits before or after VR application. The analyses 
show that substantial numbers of VR applicants entered SSD in the 60 months following VR 
application—more than 50,000 (11.3 percent) of the first-time VR applicants in 2003. SSD entry 
varies with VR applicant characteristics; those with relatively high SSD entry include non-
Hispanic whites, those not employed at application, those with more than a high school 
education, and especially those already in SSI but not SSD. There is also wide variation in SSD 
entry across states, with some states having entry percentages twice as high as others. We also 
found a positive relationship between our measure of wait time and entry into SSD, and we 
discuss strategies to estimate the causal effect of wait time on SSD entry—an effect that could 
theoretically be in either direction. Although the large number of VR applicants entering SSD 
after VR application is modest compared to the number receiving an SSD award each year, the 
impact that VR services have on later SSD and Medicare expenditures could be in the billions of 
dollars annually, in either direction. 
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Social Security disability (SSD) benefits, which are administered by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), are an essential lifeline for millions of Americans. SSD benefits are 
available to people with established work histories who have a medically determinable work 
disability expected to last at least one year or to result in death. Others with qualifying medical 
conditions are entitled to SSD by the entitlement of a parent to retirement, survivor, or disability 
benefits or a widow or widower entitled to survivor benefits. All benefits are paid from the Old 
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds; benefits for workers with 
disabilities and their dependents (disabled or not) are paid from the Disability Insurance (DI) 
Trust Fund, whereas benefits for disabled dependents of retirees and deceased workers are paid 
from the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund. 
Rapid growth in SSD beneficiaries and expenditures is of major concern to policymakers. 
SSA’s actuaries project that the DI Trust Fund will be exhausted in 2016 (Board of Trustees 
2011). Unless Congress acts, SSA will be able to pay benefits only to the extent that payroll tax 
revenues continue to flow into the Trust Fund. As a result, there is considerable interest in policy 
reforms that would slow the growth in the number of SSD entrants—especially workers with 
disabilities, who constitute a large majority of SSD beneficiaries. 
Many experts believe that early intervention, before an individual enters SSD, is the key to 
increasing the proportion of workers who stay at work or return to work after disability onset 
rather than exit the labor force and enter SSD. The federal-state Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) 
program is a potential point of early intervention for all SSD entrants, and by far the largest 
public program offering employment services exclusively to people with disabilities. 
In this paper, we report new descriptive information on the extent to which VR applicants 
receive SSD before or after VR application.1
The analyses shows that substantial numbers of VR applicants entered SSD in the 60 months 
following VR application—more than 50,000 (11.3 percent) of the first-time VR applicants in 
2003. SSD entry varies with VR applicant characteristics; those with relatively high SSD entry 
include non-Hispanic whites, those not employed at application, those with more than a high 
school education, and especially those already in SSI but not SSD. There is also wide variation in 
SSD entry across states, with some states having entry percentages twice as high as others. 
 We use complete matches of individual-level VR 
closure records from the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) for 1998 through 2009 to 
SSA demographic, disability program, and earnings files. We report findings on annual cohorts 
of first-time applicants for VR services in each year from 1998 through 2005 to track trends in 
SSD entry after VR application. In addition, we use a single cohort—those who applied for VR 
services in 2002—to provide more extensive information on the characteristics and SSD 
outcomes for specific groups. 
                                                 
1 We refer to SSDI workers, disabled adult children, and disabled widow(er) beneficiaries collectively as 
“Social Security disability beneficiaries.” Some writers use SSD to include all Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
recipients under the age of 65. We do not do so here, however, because SSI benefits are a welfare benefit and not 
part of the Social Security program, even though both programs are administered by the SSA. 
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We also assess the potential for using the matched data to evaluate the impact of VR 
services on SSD entry by VR applicants who have not already received an SSD award. We 
consider the hypothetical impacts of VR service delivery on SSD entry and how those impacts 
might vary with certain applicant characteristics, such as the ability to engage in substantial 
gainful activity (SGA) and non-medical eligibility for SSD. Finally, we consider evaluating the 
impact of exogenous delays in VR service delivery on SSD entry for VR applicants and present 
statistics on the extent of such delays. 
We describe the positive relationship between our measure of wait time and entry into SSD, 
and we discuss strategies to estimate the causal effect of wait time on SSD entry—an effect that 
could theoretical be in either direction. Although the large number of VR applicants entering 
SSD after VR application is modest compared to the number receiving an SSD award each year, 
the impact that VR services have on later SSD and Medicare expenditures could be in the 
billions of dollars annually, in either direction. Additional research may provide better 
information on the direction and size of current impacts. More important, the findings suggest 
the potential value of cross-agency collaboration designed to improve long-term employment 
outcomes for workers before they enter SSD. 
We provide more background on SSD and the VR program in Section II. In Section III, we 
describe previous research related to SSD entry and VR services. We describe the matched 
administrative data in Section IV. In Section V, we present statistics on the number of new VR 
applicants, their SSD and disability insured status at VR application, and later entry into SSD. 
We present statistics on SSD entry by VR applicant characteristics in Section VI. Our assessment 
of the potential for evaluating the impact of VR services on SSD awards appears in Section VII. 
We conclude in Section VIII with a summary of the findings and a discussion of the implications 




A. SSD Eligibility Criteria 
SSD is the nation’s primary earnings replacement program for workers who become unable 
to support themselves through work because of a physical or mental impairment (“disabled 
workers”). The program also provides disability benefits to disabled adult children (DAC) and 
disabled widow(ers) of other OASDI beneficiaries. In making determinations about SSD 
disability eligibility, SSA assesses whether a person (1) is unable to engage in SGA for at least 
12 months or until death (the “medical eligibility”) and (2) either meets the earnings history 
requirement for SSD eligibility, or is entitled to Social Security as a dependent of another 
beneficiary (“non-medical eligibility”). As these requirements play an important role in how VR 
services might affect SSD entry, we consider them in some detail. 
SSA defines SGA as the performance of significant physical and/or mental activities in work 
for pay or profit, or in work of a type generally performed for pay or profit. In 2012, SGA is 
defined as any activity that is comparable to unsubsidized paid work for monthly wages of at 
least $1,010 for non-blind individuals or $1,690 for blind individuals.2
After SSD entry, beneficiaries will lose their benefits if they engage in SGA for a 
sufficiently long period. The law requires immediate termination of benefits if the person’s 
medical condition improves enough to allow engagement in SGA (“medical recovery”) or if the 
individual engages in SGA before the end of the 12 months starting with the month of disability 
onset (including the 5-month waiting period). After that, if medical recovery has not occurred, an 
SSD beneficiary is allowed to engage in SGA for a limited period without benefit loss. This 
includes 9 trial work period (TWP) months followed by 3 grace period months in which a 
beneficiary may earn any amount without benefit loss. After that, benefits first are suspended, 
and then terminated (starting in month 37 after TWP completion), if the beneficiary continues to 
engage in SGA. 
 To be eligible for SSD, 
SSA must determine that the beneficiary is not able to engage in SGA for a medical reason, and 
is in fact not engaged in SGA, for a period of at least 12 months. There is a five-month benefit 
waiting period that starts with the “month of disability onset”—the first month for which SSA 
determines that the claimant meets both the medical criterion and non-medical eligibility criteria. 
The non-medical criterion is also complex. For disabled workers, satisfaction is dependent 
on the worker’s history of the earnings in covered employment—jobs that require the payment of 
payroll taxes by the worker and employer (almost all jobs today). To evaluate satisfaction of the 
requirement, SSA first converts annual earnings in covered employment from past years into 
“quarters of coverage” (QC). In 2012, one QC requires calendar year earnings of $1,130, an 
amount that is adjusted for wage inflation every year. Workers who earn more than $4,520 in 
2012 are credited with the maximum of four QC for the year. Note that an individual does not 
have to engage in SGA to earn quarters of coverage; the QC amount is 37 percent as large as 
three months of earnings at the non-blind SGA amount―$3,030 in 2012. 
                                                 
2 The SGA amount includes the total (unsubsidized) earnings net of allowable expenses that SSA classifies 
under impairment-related work expenses (IRWE). 
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To meet the SSD earnings history requirement, a disabled worker beneficiary must be both 
“fully insured” and “disability insured.” To be fully insured, the individual must have 
accumulated QC at least as large as the difference between the individual’s current age and 
age 21, with a minimum of 6 QC. Thus, apart from the minimum, the individual must have 
accumulated an average of one QC per year after age 21. To be disability insured, a worker age 
31 or older must have earned at least 20 QC in the previous 40 calendar quarters, or an average 
of 2 QC per year. Workers ages 24 through 30 must have earned an average of 2 QC per year 
since they were age 21―a minimum less than 20. Workers under age 24 must have earned at 
least six QC in the last 12 calendar quarters. There is no minimum age for disabled-worker 
benefits. 
DAC and DWB are not required to meet work history requirements themselves. Instead, 
they must be an eligible dependant of a primary beneficiary—an individual entitled to any 
OASDI benefit on the basis of the individual’s own earnings history. Adult children of primary 
beneficiaries qualify for DAC if disability onset is determined to have occurred before age 22; 
before age 18 they would qualify on the basis of age alone. Widow(ers) of primary beneficiaries 
must be at least 50 to qualify as a DWB; if not disabled, they must wait to age 60 before they are 
eligible for survivor benefits. 
B. SSD Policy Concerns 
The number of SSD beneficiaries is very large. In December 2010, 9.4 million people 
received SSD benefits, including 8.2 million disabled workers; 949,000 DAC; and 
245,000 DWB (SSA 2011a, Tables 5.D1, 5.F4 and 5.F8). In 2010, an estimated $134 billion in 
benefits were paid to SSD beneficiaries, of which $124 billion came from the DI Trust Funds.3
Federal expenditures to support SSD beneficiaries are much larger once other benefits they 
receive are considered, although there is no complete accounting. SSD beneficiaries are 
automatically entitled to Medicare after 24 months of entitlement to SSD. According to the 
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), in 2011, Medicare expenditures for the under-
65 population—almost all of whom are SSD beneficiaries—totaled nearly $100 billion (CMS 
2012, Table III.5). Federal expenditures for SSD benefits and Medicare benefits for SSD 
beneficiaries accounted for more than 6 percent of all federal outlays.
 
The latter figure far exceeded the $104 billion in DI Trust Fund revenues, and the Trustees 
currently project that the Fund will be exhausted by the end of 2016 unless Congress takes action 
to increase revenue and/or reduce benefits. 
4
                                                 
3 The DI Trust Fund total is from the Social Security Trustees (2011, Table III.A5) and includes payments for 
disabled workers and all dependents, including any DAC. The same table shows $2.1 billion in benefit payments to 
DWB, but does not report total benefit payments to DAC of retired or deceased workers. We estimated the latter by 
multiplying 12 times the December 2010 mean benefit for DAC of retired workers by the number of DAC of retired 
workers (12 x $587.20 x 250,262), then repeating for DAC of deceased workers (12 x $755.10 x 601,420) and 
adding the results to obtain an estimated $7.2 billion in OASI Trust Fund expenditures for DAC (mean benefits and 
numbers from SSA 2011b, Table 2). 
 
4 Total outlays in 2011 were $3,603 billion (Congressional Budget Office 2012). 
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A significant minority of SSD beneficiaries also receive SSI—13.2 percent in 
December 2010, adding an estimated $3.8 billion dollars in cash benefits.5
Past efforts to reduce SSD caseloads and program expenditures have focused on helping 
beneficiaries return to work with sufficient earnings to forgo their SSD benefits. To date, those 
efforts have been largely unsuccessful in slowing growth in the number of SSD beneficiaries or 
public expenditures for their support. 
 The vast majority of 
those receiving SSI, as well as a small minority of other SSD beneficiaries, also receive 
Medicaid. Some beneficiaries also receive other public benefits, such as veterans’ compensation, 
veterans’ health benefits, food stamps, and housing subsidies. Some also receive private benefits, 
most notably workers’ compensation and private disability insurance (PDI) or pension benefits. 
Many practitioners and researchers have recommended taking a different tack: reducing the 
number of individuals who enter SSD via services and incentives that help them establish or 
maintain self-sufficiency through work rather than enter SSD.6 SSA has previously considered 
testing whether VR agencies could successfully provide early intervention services for disabled 
worker applicants—effectively diverting them from entry into SSD (Berkowitz 2002). This is the 
first study to examine the extent to which applicants for VR services actually enter SSD after 
application for VR services. 
C. State Vocational Rehabilitation 
As the primary source of publicly funded employment supports for people with disabilities, 
state VR agencies are well-positioned to assist people with disabilities to work rather than enter 
SSD. VR agencies help individuals return to work or gain new employment, as opposed to 
simply providing cash payments or insurance (Scotch 2001), and many SSA beneficiaries have 
acknowledged the role of VR in their efforts to return to work (GAO 2007). Hence, it seems very 
likely that VR services serve as an early intervention, as defined above, when provided to some 
clients. 
RSA funds state VR agencies to provide employment-related services for individuals with 
disabilities and requires the agencies to give priority to individuals who are significantly disabled 
should the state be unable to serve all eligible individuals. Federal grants made to each state’s 
designated VR agency are administered under an approved state plan. The state-matching 
requirement is 21.3 percent.7 Total expenditures for fiscal year (FY) 2010 were $3.04 billion. 
Awards ranged in value from $820,583 to $289,165,167.8
                                                 
5 Estimate equal to 12 times the number of SSD beneficiaries receiving SSI in December 2012 times their 
average monthly benefit (12 x 1,369,462 x $230.40). Source: (SSA 2011, Tables 65 and 66). 
 States report electronic data on each 
VR client whose case is closed (case “closures”) in each fiscal year according to a prescribed 
case service report format. These data are stored electronically in the RSA 911 file—
612,537 records in FY 2010. 
6 Examples include: MacDonald and O’Neil (2006), Social Security Advisory Board (2006), Stapleton et al. 
(2006), Autor and Duggan (2010), Burkhauser and Daly (2011), and Mann and Stapleton (2011). 
7 See Government Accountability Office (GAO 2009) for an analysis of the federal and state funding 
mechanism. 
8 Retrieved from http://www2.ed.gov/programs/rsabvrs/funding.html, on June 5, 2012. 
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State VR counselors coordinate the VR eligibility and service determination process. The 
determination process typically includes additional assessment regarding disability, a review of 
the consumer’s history, and a mutually agreed-upon individual plan for employment (IPE) 
(Rubin and Roessler 2001). Using the IPE as a guide, the VR counselor is expected to facilitate 
placement in competitive employment and help the client “maximize employability, 
independence, integration, and participation of people with disabilities in the workplace and the 
community” (Parker et al. 2005). Hence, for all applicants that complete an IPE, the IPE and 
subsequent VR services can be described as an intervention with an expectation or expected 
outcome of satisfactory performance in employment (Colling and Davis 2005). This does not 
necessarily mean engagement in SGA, however. 
For eligible individuals, the VR agencies may offer information, services and supports (such 
as counseling), assistive technology, job accommodations, mental or physical restoration, 
prosthetic or orthotic devices, job-search/placement assistance, transportation, and personal 
assistance. Counselors also coordinate training-related services including vocational assessment 
and postsecondary education (including graduate-level coursework). Most VR services are 
provided at no cost to the individual, particularly when financial need is demonstrated (Rubin 
and Roessler 2001). 
Based on the RSA 911 data, a substantial percentage of those accepted for VR services 
report a prior employment history, although this does not necessarily mean that they are 
disability insured. The majority of these consumers exited with an employment outcome. 
Furthermore, 89.9 percent of VR cases closed in FY 2002 had not entered SSD as of the closure 
month.9
                                                 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies have been conducted on VR client outcomes and SSD status. They have 
shown that there is substantial covariation between SSD status and VR employment outcomes, or 
between services provided to SSD beneficiaries and employment outcomes, but information on 
causal relationships is limited. Using a quasi-experimental design, Tremblay et al. (2006) found 
that use of specialized benefits counseling has a positive impact on the employment outcomes of 
VR clients with psychiatric disabilities who are on SSD. Using RSA 911 data, Rogers et al. 
(2005) found that job placement services caused a three-fold increase in competitive employment 
at closure for SSI and SSD beneficiaries. Researchers also have examined VR outcomes for SSD 
beneficiaries compared to non-SSD. For example, Stapleton and Erickson (2004) used the 
Longitudinal Study of the Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program (LSVRS) to show that 
clients who are SSD or SSI beneficiaries are much less likely than other clients to earn above the 
SGA earnings level even after controlling for many detailed, observed client characteristics. 
Another strand of literature has examined how characteristics of workers with disabilities 
and access to employment services affect SSD entry. This research does not focus on VR 
services, however, and the identified relationships between services and SSD entry are not 
necessarily causal. For instance, Honeycutt and Brucker (2006) have considered social, 
environmental, and clinical traits that are predictive of SSD entry. There is a substantial literature 
on early intervention services provided to workers by workers’ compensation insurers, private 
disability insurers, and disability management vendors—for example, McLaren et al. (2010) and 
Habeck et al. (2010). In general, these studies show that employer-based policies and programs, 
particularly at large firms, are effective in retaining employees who would otherwise exit jobs 
due to health or disability reasons. 
One recent study, the Demonstration to Maintain Independence and Employment (DMIE), 
used rigorous experimental methods to estimate the impact of enhanced medical and person-
centered case management services that “wraparound” usual health care services on employment 
and benefit outcomes for workers not initially receiving SSD or SSI benefits. In two of the four 
demonstrations that had comparable interventions and relatively large sample sizes (in 
Minnesota and Texas), Whalen et al. (2012) found that the treatment group subjects were 
significantly less likely to receive SSD or SSI within one year after enrollment—1.8 percent 
versus 3.2, a reduction of over 40 percent. Point estimates of impacts for other states and for SSD 
entry alone were consistent with this finding but were not statistically significant. Estimates for 
impacts on employment and earnings were all insignificant and of mixed signs. 
Most of the evidence of success with early intervention services is based on services 
delivered before the worker’s employment is terminated. Its applicability to VR services is very 
unclear, because VR agencies rarely reach out to employers with the intent of helping their 
workers immediately following disability onset.10
                                                 
 Nor does there appear to be any other evidence 
on SSD entry following VR application, let alone on the efficacy of VR services in helping 
clients stay in the labor force and become reliant on SSD.  
10 Alabama’s Retaining A Valued Employee (RAVE) program is a notable exception, but we have found no 
rigorous evidence on its effectiveness. 
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This study addresses a gap in the research literature on characteristics and traits related to 
SSD entry after application for VR services. Researchers have previously examined how VR 
client characteristics, including program status while receiving VR services, are related to 
employment outcomes at VR closure, but to our knowledge no one has considered SSD 
outcomes for those not already receiving SSD. 
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IV. METHOD AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
In this study, we used RSA 911 closure records for the years 1998 through 2009 matched to 
records from SSA’s Numident File, Ticket Research File (TRF), and Master Earnings File 
(MEF). We first provide information on the source files and the processes for matching data 
records and conducting analyses; provision of the latter was complicated by restrictions on data 
access necessary to comply with privacy laws and regulations. We then describe the analytic data 
file constructed from these records and discuss issues with some of the administrative variables. 
Finally, we consider the statistical methods used to produce the findings in this document. 
As Figure IV.1 illustrates, we identified participants using the RSA 911 administrative data, 
which are compiled on an annual basis and include state level data on all VR applicants, case 
closures, services, and outcomes. We used the SSA Numident, the official record of all Social 
Security numbers (SSNs), to verify the SSNs in the RSA 911 file, excluding records for second 
or later occurrences of the same SSN. Using the validated SSNs, we submitted a finder file for 
the Master Earnings File (MEF), longitudinal records of earnings data based on tax reports. We 
used the MEF solely to determine disability insurance (DI) eligibility. Finally, we matched the 
subfile to the 2009 version of the TRF (TRF09), which includes a record for every individual age 
18 to 65 who received an SSD benefit in at least one month since 1996. Among other data, the 
TRF includes data on monthly benefits, demographic characteristics, primary impairment, TWP 
status, and months with no benefits following suspension or termination for work. The TRF and 
MEF are restricted-use data sets. Hildebrand and others (2009) provide full documentation on the 
TRF09.11
We provide details of the data extracted from each of the source files for each matched 
record in the appendix. Briefly, for the RSA 911, we extracted demographic (e.g., race, age, 
gender) information, programmatic information (such as application, IPE and closure dates), and 
state agency. We used the Numident to validate the identification information in the 
7,457,183 records from the RSA 911, on the basis of SSN, sex and date of birth. Cases that do 
not match (4.9 percent of those submitted―367,696) are not included in the analysis file. Data 
from the TRF include month of first SSD payment, which we used to determine whether the VR 
applicant had been first paid a benefit during or before the VR application month, during or 
before the applicant’s closure month, and as of the end of 12-month intervals after the month of 
VR application, up to 60 months. A qualified SSA employee used the MEF record to determine 
whether the VR client was disability insured as of the VR application month. The final analysis 
file includes one record for each unique VR applicant from 1998 to 2005 (N = 3,656,105). Many 
of the statistics presented are for the FY 2002 applicants, of which there are 480,566 in the file. 
 
                                                 
11 Starting with the 2011 update, the new name for the TRF is the Disability Analysis File (DAF). 
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SSA TRF SSA MEF
Analysis File:
Longitudinal VR and SSA selected 
data on all new VR applicants,
1998-2009
 
Many VR applicants have received VR services in the past. Our interest is in “new” 
applicants―those applying for services for the first time—and their later experiences. Hence, we 
excluded records from the analyses files if there was evidence of earlier VR application or 
service receipt. Two types of evidence were available. The RSA 911 includes a field for previous 
closure, and we excluded records that indicated previous closure within 36 months of the date of 
application. In addition, some applicants had multiple applications in our sample period, in 
which case we included only the first. The data could be used to study repeat clients―that is, 
repeated use of VR services by a client over the sample period―but we have not done so for this 
paper. 
There are a number of known problems with the data. First, a small share of first-time 
applicants from this period, especially in the most recent years, was excluded because their first 
cases had not closed by the end of 2009. Second, we cannot be sure that all remaining records are 
for individuals who were applying for VR services for the first time. This is likely a more 
significant problem for the early years of the sample period (i.e., FY 2000 and before) than for 
the later years, as in later years we are able to directly observe the recent history of VR 
application for each applicant rather than rely on the RSA 911 information for closures in the last 
three years. 
Third, for those awarded SSD benefits, we cannot be certain whether they first received a 
primary award as a disabled worker or as a DAC or DWB. Instead, we know only their most 
recent reported status. This likely results in some errors in classification across status categories 
as of the application month as some beneficiaries find it advantageous to change their status 
following the initial SSD award. For instance, a young disabled worker can become dually 
entitled as a DAC status when a parent claims retirement benefits. In our data, such beneficiaries 
are counted as DAC, but they might not have been DAC at the time of VR application. 
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Once we created the matched records for new VR applicants, we sorted them according to 
calendar year of application, creating annual cohorts of new VR applicants. Each statistic 
presented in later sections is based on the sample for the annual cohort indicated. Most of the 
statistics presented are means or percentages for the population of all individuals in the applicant 
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V. SSD AWARD EXPERIENCE OF ANNUAL VR APPLICANT COHORTS 
FOR 1998 THROUGH 2005 
In this section, we present longitudinal SSD award statistics for annual cohorts of new VR 
applicants for 1998 through 2005. For each cohort, we present statistics on the number and 
percentage awarded SSD in the month of VR application or earlier, as of VR closure, and as of 
the end of 12-month intervals after the month of VR application. To the extent they have been 
observed, we also compare the longitudinal percentages across the cohorts. 
Detailed SSD award statistics are presented in Table V.1. Each statistic is cumulative; that 
is, it indicates whether an SSD award ever was made to the applicant in or before the month 
indicated. If an award was made in the past but SSD benefits were suspended or terminated in or 
before the month indicated, as is true in a small minority of cases, the applicant is still counted as 
having entered SSD. The percentages ever having received an SSD award are plotted in 
Figure V.1. 
For all cohorts with 72 months of data post-application, we found the overall percentage of 
VR applicants entering SSD after VR application (12 months to 72 months) ranged from 
12.6 percentage points to 13.7 percentage points (Table V.1). There is a substantial positive trend 
across successive cohorts in the percentage having entered SSD as of VR application and a 
positive, but lower, increase in the percentage having entered as of closure. For each cohort, the 
largest 12-month increase in SSD awards occurred in the first 12 months after VR application. 
The cohorts for years 1998 through 2000 show the largest percentage increases as of the 
12th month. After 24 months, the percentage of new VR applicants receiving an SSD award in 
each cohort increases by approximately 1 to 2 percentage points per year. 
Figure V.1 plots data on the 1998 through 2003 cohorts over the 60 months after VR 
application. We exclude the later cohorts because incomplete processing of their SSD 
applications might affect their SSD entry statistics for later months. Using the 1999 trend line as 
an example, 2.8 percent (13,604) of the new VR applicants had entered SSD as of the month of 
application. The percentage having entered SSD increased rapidly during the first 36 months, 
rising to 14.5 percent by 60 months after VR application. Figure V.1 also shows an increase in 
the annual trend in the percentage having entered SSD by the time of VR application, from 
1.2 percent for the 1998 cohort to 6.3 percent for the 2003 cohort, with an approximately equal 
increase as of 60 months after VR application (from 12.5 percent to 17.6 percent). The fact that 
the percentage at 60 months for the 2003 cohort is slightly lower than the corresponding value 
for the 2002 cohort might reflect longer than usual processing times for SSD applications 






Table V.1. The Number and Percentage of New VR Applicants Ever Having Received an SSD Award as of the VR Application Month; 
Months 12, 24, 36, 48, 60, and 72 Since Application; and at VR Closure, by Application Year 
Application 
Year 
At Application At 12 Months At 24 Months At 36 Months At 48 Months At 60 Months At 72 Months At Closure 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
1998 5,945 1.2% 25,910 5.1% 38,373 7.6% 46,995 9.3% 55,548 11.0% 63,315 12.5% 70,167 13.8% 32,932 6.5% 
1999 13,604 2.8% 33,024 6.8% 45,169 9.3% 54,852 11.3% 63,124 13.0% 70,430 14.5% 77,282 15.9% 39,363 8.1% 
2000 19,306 4.0% 38,153 8.0% 51,484 10.7% 61,458 12.8% 69,314 14.5% 76,642 16.0% 83,244 17.4% 44,676 9.3% 
2001 22,085 4.6% 42,015 8.8% 55,921 11.7% 65,836 13.7% 74,136 15.5% 81,293 17.0% 87,793 18.3% 48,279 10.1% 
2002 26,344 5.5% 45,876 9.5% 59,215 12.3% 69,745 14.5% 77,971 16.2% 85,376 17.8% 88,696 18.5% 49,328 10.3% 
2003 28,136 6.3% 45,569 10.2% 58,182 13.0% 67,835 15.1% 75,556 16.8% 78,965 17.6%   49,712 11.1% 
2004 30,264 7.4% 45,750 11.2% 56,510 13.8% 65,284 15.9% 69,068 16.8%     48,479 11.8% 
2005 28,879 7.9% 42,120 11.5% 51,277 14.1% 55,268 15.2%       42,791 11.7% 
 
Sources: RSA 911 and TRF. 
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Figure V.1. Percentage of New VR Applicants Ever Having Received an SSD Award as of VR 
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VI. VR APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS AND SSD STATUS 
In this section, we present findings on the relationship between new VR applicant 
characteristics and SSD status at application, at closure, and 60 months after closure. We focus 
on the 2002 new applicant cohort because 2002 is the first year that changes in the RSA 911 data 
requirements were fully implemented (RSA 2002). Characteristics at VR application include 
socioeconomic and disability characteristics observed in the RSA data, SSI entry, state of 
application, disability insured status, and SSD entry. 
Statistics on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of this cohort appear in 
Tables VI.1 and VI.2. For those with each characteristic, we also report the percentage ever 
awarded SSD at application, closure and 60 months after application. As Table VI.1 indicates, 
the majority of VR applicants were male (55 percent), most were non-Hispanic white 
(64.3 percent), and over 40 percent were under age 30. Among racial or ethnic groups, 
Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders were the least likely ever to receive SSD after VR application 
and non-Hispanic whites were the most likely. VR applicants ages 50 through 59 had the largest 
percentage increase in SSD entry between time of application and closure, and were most likely 
to receive SSD at 60 months. As anticipated, VR applicants employed at time of application 
were less likely to have entered SSD as of application, closure, or 60 months after application. 
The higher the level of education at application, the more likely the applicant had already 
entered SSD, or had done so as of closure and at 60 months. For example, 5.8 percent of VR 
applicants with a high school diploma had already entered SSD compared to 9.8 percent of those 
with a bachelor’s degree; at 60 months both figures are higher, and the difference is larger—
19.2 percent for high school graduates and 26.2 percent for those with bachelor’s degrees.12
Among those who entered SSI by the time of VR application, a large percentage 
(28 percent) had also entered SSD as of application (Table VI.2). That figure increases to 
50 percent at closure and 94 percent at 60 months. Although some might have entered SSD as 
DAC or DWB, it seems likely that many earned enough to become disability insured; the fact 
that they applied for VR indicates intent to work. It might be that they attained disability insured 
status without achieving earnings above the SGA level or had a reduction in earnings after 
becoming disability insured. 
 
Only a little over half of applicants were already disability insured, and a very large majority 
of applicants observed entering SSD at some point in our sample period are in this group. Some 
SSD entrants were not classified as disability insured at the time of VR application—including 
2.9 percent who had been awarded SSD previously. DAC/DWB eligibility likely explains SSD 
entry for some of these applicants. One other explanation is that the algorithm used to determine 
disability insured status is based on earnings only, and some of those who had entered SSD as 
disabled workers in advance of VR entry might not have had sufficient earnings in recent years 
                                                 
12 Given that education level might increase during the period of VR service, perhaps with the agency’s 
support, the relationship of education at closure and SSD entry is also of some interest. We found that the higher the 
level of education at closure, the more likely the applicant had already entered SSD. For example, 5.1 percent of VR 
applicants with a high school diploma had already entered SSD compared to 8.7 percent of those with a bachelor’s 
degree; at 60 months both figures are higher, and the difference is larger—17.7 percent for high school graduates 
and 22.8 percent for those with bachelor’s degrees. 
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to maintain disability insured status. Those who enter SSD after application might have achieved 
disability insured status at a later date. 
Table VI.1. Demographic Characteristics of the 2002 New VR Applicant Cohort and Percentage 
Ever Awarded SSD as of Application, Closure, and 60 Months After Application 
 VR Applicants 
SSD as of 
Application SSD as of Close 
SSD as of 
60 Months 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % 
All Applicants 480,566  26,344 5.5% 49,328 10.3% 85,376 17.8% 
Race/Ethnicity         
White 308,996 64.3% 17,237 5.6% 33,941 11.0% 59,018 19.1% 
Black 106,671 22.2% 6,033 5.7% 10,080 9.4% 16,944 15.9% 
Hispanic 5,649 1.2% 273 4.8% 473 8.4% 864 15.3% 
American Indian 4,892 1.0% 329 6.7% 580 11.9% 882 18.0% 
Asian 1,487 0.3% 102 6.9% 170 11.4% 234 15.7% 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 19,079 4.0% 766 4.0% 1,084 5.7% 2,570 13.5% 
Multiple race 32,393 6.7% 1,505 4.6% 2,868 8.9% 4,577 14.1% 
Missing 1,399 0.3% 99 7.1% 132 9.4% 287 20.5% 
Gender         
Male 265,677 55.3% 14,132 5.3% 27,253 10.3% 46,674 17.6% 
Female 214,889 44.7% 12,212 5.7% 22,075 10.3% 38,702 18.0% 
Age         
Under 18 43,033 9.0% 0 0.0% 1,283 3.0% 2,298 5.3% 
18-29 151,169 31.5% 6,527 4.3% 11,117 7.4% 18,669 12.3% 
30-39 98,542 20.5% 6,297 6.4% 10,875 11.0% 18,124 18.4% 
40-49 112,121 23.3% 7,346 6.6% 13,871 12.4% 25,174 22.5% 
50-59 58,362 12.1% 4,938 8.5% 10,365 17.8% 18,805 32.2% 
60-FRA 17,339 3.6% 1,236 7.1% 1,817 10.5% 2,306 13.3% 
Employment Status         
Employed 92,417 19.2% 2,040 2.2% 4,877 5.3% 11,073 12.0% 
Not employed 381,941 79.5% 24,008 6.3% 44,094 11.5% 73,378 19.2% 
Missing 6,208 1.3% 296 4.8% 357 5.8% 925 14.9% 
Disability-Insured Status         
Yes 245,348 51.1% 19,639 8.0% 31,889 13.0% 48,321 19.7% 
No 235,218 48.9% 6,705 2.9% 17,439 7.4% 37,055 15.8% 
Education at Application         
No formal education 2,035 0.4% 89 4.4% 167 8.2% 341 16.8% 
8th grade or less 20,889 4.3% 803 3.8% 1,645 7.9% 3,349 16.0% 
9th-12th grade, no diploma 136,780 28.5% 4,251 3.1% 8,557 6.3% 15,997 11.7% 
Special-education certificate 28,310 5.9% 1,371 4.8% 2,361 8.3% 4,341 15.3% 
High school graduate or GED 173,439 36.1% 9,973 5.8% 18,792 10.8% 33,341 19.2% 
Post-secondary education, no 
degree 
63,084 13.1% 4,890 7.8% 8,778 13.9% 13,923 22.1% 
Associate’s or vocational/ 
technical certification 
26,264 5.5% 2,197 8.4% 4,131 15.7% 6,709 25.5% 
Bachelor’s degree 20,248 4.2% 1,986 9.8% 3609 17.8% 5,306 26.2% 
Master’s degree or higher 6,177 1.3% 641 10.4% 1116 18.1% 1,613 26.1% 
Missing 3,340 0.7% 143 4.3% 172 5.1% 456 13.7% 
Education at Close         
No formal education 1,824 0.4% 77 4.2% 139 7.6% 304 16.7% 
8th grade or less 16,406 3.4% 656 4.0% 1,344 8.2% 2,767 16.9% 
9th-12th grade, no diploma 85,594 17.8% 3,046 3.6% 5,804 6.8% 11,233 13.1% 
Special-education certificate 32,345 6.7% 1,470 4.5% 2,601 8.0% 4,826 14.9% 
High school graduate or GED 183,465 38.2% 9,284 5.1% 17,815 9.7% 32,537 17.7% 
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Post-secondary education, no 
degree 
72,749 15.1% 5,123 7.0% 9,619 13.2% 14,954 20.6% 
Associate’s or vocational/ 
technical certification 
39,359 8.2% 2,916 7.4% 5,557 14.1% 8,534 21.7% 
Bachelor’s degree 25,820 5.4% 2,244 8.7% 4,167 16.1% 5,895 22.8% 
Master’s degree or higher 7,276 1.5% 732 10.1% 1,301 17.9% 1,820 25.0% 
Missing 15,728 3.3% 796 5.1% 981 6.2% 2,506 15.9% 
Sources: RSA 911 2002, MEF, and TRF. 
Note: There were no people who were both under age 18 and an SSD beneficiary at the time of VR application. 
Table VI.2. Employment and Program Status of the 2002 New VR Applicant Cohort and Percentage 
Ever Awarded SSD as of Application, Closure, and 60 Months After Application 
 VR Applicants 
SSD as of 
Application SSD as of Close 
SSD as of 60 
Months 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % 
All Applicants 480,566  26,344 5.5% 49,328 10.3% 85,376 17.8% 
Employment Status         
Employed 92,417 19.2% 2,040 2.2% 4,877 5.3% 11,073 12.0% 
Not employed 381,941 79.5% 24,008 6.3% 44,094 11.5% 73,378 19.2% 
Missing 6,208 1.3% 296 4.8% 357 5.8% 925 14.9% 
SSI Status (at VR application)         
Never 460,721 95.9% 20,711 4.5% 39,442 8.6% 66,732 14.5% 
Current Pay 14,701 3.1% 4,154 28.3% 7,248 49.3% 13,837 94.1% 
1619(b) 2,712 0.6% 774 28.5% 1,421 52.4% 2,533 93.4% 
Other suspense/termination 2,432 0.5% 705 29.0% 1,217 50.0% 2,274 93.5% 
Disability-Insured Status         
Yes 245,348 51.1% 19,639 8.0% 31,889 13.0% 48,321 19.7% 
No 235,218 48.9% 6,705 2.9% 17,439 7.4% 37,055 15.8% 
SSD Status (at VR application)        
SSD entered 26,344 5.5% 26,344 100.0% 26,344 100.0% 26,344 100.0% 
Disabled workera 23,542 4.9% 23,542 100.0% 23,542 100.0% 23,542 100.0% 
DAC/DWBa 2,802 0.6% 2,802 100.0% 2,802 100.0% 2,802 100.0% 
SSD not entered 454,222 94.5% - 0.0% 22,984 5.1% 59,032 13.0% 
Disabled workera,b - 0.0% - 0.0% 21,362 4.7% 55,719 12.3% 
DAC/DWBa,b - 0.0% - 0.0% 1,622 0.4% 3,313 0.7% 
Sources: RSA 911, MEF, and TRF. 
aClassification as DAC/DWB is based on most recent status reported in the TRF, and some VR applicants who were 
disabled workers as of the application month might have subsequently attained DAC/DWB status. 
bThe base for percentages in this row is the total number of applicants in the SSD Not Entered category. 
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To investigate this further, we produced descriptive statistics for the 46,348 individuals 
(1.3 percent) across all cohort years (1998 through 2005) who had received an SSD award but 
were not disability insured at time of VR application (Appendix A).13
Figure VI.1 displays cumulative SSD entry statistics by state of VR application. The bottom 
bar for each state indicates the percentage ever awarded SSD at application, the middle bar 
shows the additional percentage awarded SSD by the closure month, and the top bar shows the 
additional percentage awarded SSD through month 60 after application. The states have been 
ordered according to the percentage ever awarded SSD through the month 60. Puerto Rico, South 
Carolina, Utah and the District of Columbia are at the low end of the spectrum, with under 
15 percent having entered SSD through month 60. Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire 
are at the high end, with approximately 30 percent—more than twice as high as those with the 
lowest percentages. Among the larger states, Texas and New York have relatively lower rates of 
SSD entry. Appendix B shows the detailed statistics for each state. 
 These statistics suggest 
that many are DAC. We would expect DAC entrants to be relatively young, and compared to the 
2002 VR new applicants, these entrants are (nearly 50 percent are age 29 or younger compared 
to 40 percent in the 2002 cohort). 
The final set of statistics in Table VI.2 is for SSD status as of VR application. Here we 
differentiate between disabled workers and DAC/DWB as of the most recent status in the 
TRF09. That status might have changed since VR application; specifically, some disabled 
workers might have become DAC/DWB.14
Statistics for the primary impairment reported by the VR agency appear in Table VI.3. A 
majority of first-time VR applicants in 2002 were reported to have a cognitive impairment 
(22.6 percent), a psychosocial impairment (19.3 percent), or other mental impairment 
(10.4 percent). However, smaller groups were the most likely to receive SSD at each time point: 
those reported to have general physical debilitation, blindness, or mobility and/or manipulation 
impairments. Those in the various deafness/hearing loss categories were less likely than others to 
have entered SSD at each time point, although those reported to have deafness and communicate 
primarily by visual means were about twice as likely as others with deafness or hearing loss to 
have entered SSD by the 60th month after application. 
 The table shows that at most only a very small share 
of applicants had entered SSD already in DAC/DWB status (0.6 percent); over eight times as 
many (at least 4.9 percent) had already entered SSD as disabled workers. Those who entered 
SSD only after application were much more likely to be in the disabled worker category than in 
DAC/DWB status; for instance, at 60 months 0.7 percent of this group had entered as 
DAC/DWB at most (given the possible classification change), whereas at least 12.3 percent had 
entered as disabled workers. 
                                                 
13 Authors calculation based on analysis file N= 3,656,105. 
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Table VI.3. Primary Disabilities of the 2002 New VR Applicant Cohort, by Ever SSD Award Status at 
Application, Closure, and 60 Months After Application 
 VR Applicants At Application At Close At 60 Months 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % 
All Applicants 480,566  26,344 5.5% 49,328 10.3% 85,376 17.8% 
VR Disability Status         
No impairment 9,304 1.9% 263 2.8% 318 3.4% 1,118 12.0% 
Blindness 9,923 2.1% 1,032 10.4% 2,098 21.1% 2,611 26.3% 
Other visual impairment 10,769 2.2% 509 4.7% 1,259 11.7% 2,335 21.7% 
Deafness, primary communication 
visual 
4,083 0.8% 263 6.4% 648 15.9% 917 22.5% 
Deafness, primary communication 
auditory 
1,970 0.4% 42 2.1% 130 6.6% 241 12.2% 
Hearing loss, primary 
communication visual 
2,412 0.5% 56 2.3% 126 5.2% 265 11.0% 
Hearing loss, primary 
communication auditory 
12,770 2.7% 132 1.0% 353 2.8% 1,005 7.9% 
Other hearing impairments 988 0.2% 21 2.1% 46 4.7% 89 9.0% 
Deaf-blindness 255 0.1% 11 4.3% 24 9.4% 40 15.7% 
Communicative impairments 3,486 0.7% 156 4.5% 319 9.2% 508 14.6% 
Mobility orthopedic/neurological 
impairments 
30,964 6.4% 2,415 7.8% 5,040 16.3% 8,324 26.9% 
Manipulation/dexterity orthopedic/ 
neurological impairments 
14,255 3.0% 685 4.8% 1,691 11.9% 3,163 22.2% 
Both mobility and 
manipulation/dexterity/ 
orthopedic/neurological impairments 
17,445 3.6% 1,777 10.2% 3,609 20.7% 5,559 31.9% 
Other orthopedic impairments 29,651 6.2% 1,592 5.4% 3,575 12.1% 7,037 23.7% 
Respiratory impairments 4,886 1.0% 392 8.0% 673 13.8% 1,128 23.1% 
General physical debilitation 14,270 3.0% 1,500 10.5% 2,446 17.1% 3,851 27.0% 
Other physical impairments 36,855 7.7% 2,930 8.0% 4,879 13.2% 8,234 22.3% 
Cognitive impairments 108,579 22.6% 3,554 3.3% 6,856 6.3% 12,073 11.1% 
Psychosocial impairments 92,544 19.3% 6,061 6.5% 10,573 11.4% 16,820 18.2% 
Other mental impairments 50,150 10.4% 1,907 3.8% 3,354 6.7% 6,052 12.1% 
Missing 25,007 5.2% 1,046 4.2% 1,311 5.2% 4,006 16.0% 
Sources: RSA 911 2002 and TRF. 
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VII. POTENTIAL APPROACH TO ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF VR SERVICES 
In this section, we assess the theoretical impact of VR services on SSD award under current 
policy. We then consider the possibility of using exogenous variation in waiting time for VR 
services to estimate the impact of delay in VR service delivery on SSD award. 
A. Theory 
In this section, we review the theoretical effects of VR service delivery on SSD award. For 
reasons that are complex, the theoretical direction of the impact of VR service delivery on SSD 
award is ambiguous for those clients not receiving either SSI or SSD at the time they apply for 
VR services. In principle, VR services could help those VR applicants not on SSD who 
nonetheless meet SSD medical and non-medical eligibility criteria to engage in SGA instead of 
applying for and obtaining SSD benefits. Such an outcome seems likely if, in fact, the client is 
capable of engaging in SGA, is sufficiently motivated to do so, and receives services in a timely 
and efficacious manner. 
Not all clients who might meet SSD eligibility criteria are sufficiently capable or motivated, 
however. Some will not be able to engage in SGA at all, even with assistance from a VR agency. 
Some able to engage in SGA might not be motivated to do so because they are not able to earn 
much above the minimum SGA amount in the local labor market, or because the opportunity cost 
of work might be very high. The opportunity cost of working could be high for many reasons: 
they might need extra time every day to take care of themselves because of an impairment or 
medical condition; they might face significant impairment-related work expenses, such as 
transportation costs or the need for special equipment; SGA might pose risks to their health; or 
they might also have attractive alternative uses for their time, such as caring for a family 
member. For such a client, receipt of SSD benefits, perhaps coupled with a job that does not 
constitute SGA, might be a better option than engaging in SGA and not receiving SSD benefits. 
In such situations, VR services might accelerate the client’s entry into SSD, perhaps by helping 
the client understand SSD rules and obtain a job that does not represent SGA. 
VR counselors could potentially help those on the margin between (1) engaging in SGA 
versus (2) not engaging in SGA and entering SSD to choose the latter option. VR agencies, 
however, have an incentive to help the client enter SSD and then help and encourage the client to 
engage in SGA. This is because SSA will potentially pay the VR agency for services provided to 
an SSD (or SSI) beneficiary, provided that the client engages in SGA for some period thereafter, 
but will not pay for services provided to non-beneficiaries. For the VR agency to be eligible for a 
payment from SSA, however, the client must first obtain eligibility for SSD (or SSI) benefits. 
Otherwise, the agency must pay for the services from federal Rehabilitation Act funds and 
matching state funds. 
Under SSA’s cost-reimbursement payment system, SSA will reimburse the VR agency for 
service costs, up to a limit, provided the client engages in SGA for 9 months. Because of the 
SSD 9-month TWP and 3-month grace period, this does not necessarily mean suspension of SSD 
benefits. VR agencies also have the option of using one of the recently established Ticket-to-
Work (TTW) payment systems, rather than cost reimbursement. In 2012, VR agencies 
exclusively use the milestone-outcome payment system. Under this system, they may receive 
some milestone payments for months in which the client is working but not engaged in SGA. 
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Total milestone payments are limited, however, after which outcome payments are available only 
if the client earns enough for SSA to suspend the client’s SSD benefits. 
It is not obvious that the prospect of SSA payments actually induces VR agencies to 
encourage and help non-beneficiary clients to become beneficiaries. It is no simple matter to 
ensure that SSA will pay the agency for services delivered. Further, the VR agency’s interest in 
obtaining SSA payments is likely to depend on the adequacy of Rehabilitation Act funding and 
the state’s match. 
VR services are perhaps much more likely to lead to SSD entry for VR clients who might 
meet SSD medical eligibility criteria but are not eligible for SSD because they are not disability 
insured—especially if they are young. This includes clients already receiving SSI and who are 
therefore known to meet the SSD medical eligibility criteria. The mechanism is simple: the VR 
agency might help the client become both fully insured and disability insured, after which the 
client would automatically be eligible for SSD. As described earlier, for those under age 24, this 
status can currently be achieved by earning the equivalent of $4,520 in one calendar year and 
$2,260 in a second calendar year—far less than the equivalent to the monthly SGA amount over 
the same period. Although meeting the fully insured and disability-insured requirements will be 
challenging for some VR clients who meet SSA’s medical eligibility criteria, even if they are 
young, the very fact that they are applying for VR services suggests interest in and ability to 
achieve at least a low level of earnings. The fact that 94 percent of those 2002 new VR 
applicants who had already entered SSI also entered SSD as of month 60 after application is 
consistent with these observations. 
There is another strong incentive for VR clients who are not disability insured to obtain SSD 
benefits―they will become eligible for Medicare 24 months after SSD entry. This is especially 
true for those who are not insured or who will lose their eligibility under a parent’s plan in the 
near future. For those already receiving Medicaid—often by virtue of the fact they are receiving 
SSI—this incentive is not necessarily strong because Medicaid pays for a much broader range of 
services, including those that help the individual to maintain his or her functional ability. 
Medicare might, however, provide the individual with better access to specialty and acute care 
because of less restrictive payment rates and utilization controls. 
Perhaps more important for VR clients who are enrolled in Medicaid, the state has a 
financial incentive to help the client obtain Medicare. The state pays a share of Medicaid 
expenditures, whereas Medicare is funded entirely by the federal government. As Medicaid is 
always the payer of last resort, the client’s enrollment in Medicare will reduce the state’s 
Medicaid expenditures. An analogous statement applies to state-funded mental health services. 
Based on the above, we expect VR services to (1) reduce or delay SSD entry for those 
meeting SSD eligibility criteria but who are capable of earning well above the SGA amount with 
the assistance of VR services; (2) increase or accelerate SSD entry for those meeting SSD 
eligibility criteria but who are not capable of earning well above the SGA amount even with the 
assistance of VR services; and (3) increase or accelerate SSD entry for those meeting SSD 
medical eligibility criteria but not SSD non-medical eligibility criteria. 
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B. Impact Estimation 
Estimation of the impact of VR service delivery on SSD entry is problematic because of the 
difficulty of establishing an appropriate comparison group for VR applicants. VR applicants are 
self-selected; that is, the applicants have made the decision to apply for services. Presumably, 
they are more motivated or able to work than individuals who might otherwise appear 
comparable. Some researchers have tried to address this challenge by comparing the VR group 
receiving services to VR-eligible clients whose cases are closed without receiving services 
(Dean et al. 1991). 
Another strategy is to reframe the research question to focus on delays in service delivery 
that are beyond the VR applicant’s controls. If VR services delay or accelerate SSDI 
participation, then exogenous delays in delivery of services to VR applicants presumably would 
have the opposite effect—to accelerate or delay SSD entry. Estimation of the effect of delay in 
service delivery on SSD entry requires data on VR applicants covering a period where 
substantial exogenous variation in a reliable measure of the duration from application to service 
delivery. 
The best measure of duration from VR application to service delivery available in the RSA 
911 data appears to be the duration from the application date to the date of completion of an IPE. 
The IPE is required by federal regulations and represents the first completed step in the service 
delivery process. Although available for all states, cross-state variation in the administrative use 
of the IPE likely reduces comparability of duration to IPE across states. 
There are a number of sources of variation in duration to IPE, both within and across states. 
Within-state sources include variability over time in the availability of counselors and other 
agency resources relative to the number of applicants, variability in service delivery across 
offices and counselors, and variability in client characteristics and behaviors. When an agency is 
unable to serve all applicants, it operates under “order of selection,” serving those with the most 
significant disabilities first (including those already receiving SSD or SSI) and serving those 
with less significant disabilities only after a delay, if ever. Many applicants have their cases 
closed without an IPE. For some, this is because the agency found them ineligible for services. 
Others fail to return to the agency even after they have been determined to be eligible for 
services, for reasons often not known to the agency. 
The data for the 2002 new VR applicants demonstrate that, in fact, there is substantial total 
variation in duration to IPE within a single year (Table VII.1, first column). Almost 36 percent of 
applicants had an IPE within three months of application, and an additional 10 percent had one 
within six months. Another 11 percent received an IPE before closure, but some took longer than 
three years. Almost 43 percent of the cases were closed without completion of an IPE. The latter 
group includes applicants whom the agency determined were ineligible for services, as well as 
those who were eligible but whose cases were closed without receiving any services. 
  
VII. Potential Approach to Estimating Impact of VR Services Mathematica Policy Research 
26 
Table VII.1. Duration from Application to IPE for the 2002 New VR Applicant Cohort and 
Percentage Ever Awarded SSD, as of VR Application Month, Closure, and 60 Months After 
Application 
 Not SSD as of Application SSD as of Close SSD as of 60 Months 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Total 454,222 100.0% 22,984 5.1% 59,032 13.0% 
Months to IPE       
0 to 3 161,921 35.6% 8,813 5.4% 19,194 11.9% 
4 to 6 47,304 10.4% 3,245 6.9% 6,147 13.0% 
7 to 9 19,742 4.3% 1,525 7.7% 2,769 14.0% 
10 to 12 9,869 2.2% 841 8.5% 1,423 14.4% 
13 to 18 9,680 2.1% 887 9.2% 1,423 14.7% 
19 to 24 4,300 0.9% 403 9.4% 594 13.8% 
25 to 36 4,098 0.9% 444 10.8% 619 15.1% 
37+ 2,744 0.6% 324 11.8% 393 14.3% 
Total with IPE 259,658 57.2% 16,482 6.3% 32,562 12.5% 
No IPE 194,564 42.8% 6,502 3.3% 26,516 13.6% 
Sources: RSA 911 2002 and TRF. 
If delays in VR services accelerate (or decelerate) SSD entry, holding other things constant, 
we then would expect a positive (or negative) relationship between duration to IPE and entry into 
SSD in the period after VR application. Statistics in Table VII.1 (columns 2 and 3) show that, for 
those with an IPE at case closure, there is a positive relationship between duration to IPE and 
SSD entry following application, but clearly there is not enough evidence to attribute the 
observed relationship to the effect of VR service delay on SSD entry. At closure, the percentage 
having entered SSD increases monotonically with duration to IPE. Compared to those receiving 
an IPE within 3 months of application, those receiving an IPE more than 36 months after 
application are more than twice as likely to have entered SSD (11.8 percent versus 5.4 percent). 
At 60 months after application, the relationship months are less likely than others who received 
an IPE to have entered SSD, but differences are not large. While 11.9 percent of those receiving 
an IPE within 3 months of application had entered SSD, 14.3 percent of those receiving an IPE 
after 36 months had done so. The percentage having entered SSD as of 60 months does not 
increase monotonically with duration. One example of another factor that might lead to this 
positive relationship between duration to IPE and SSD entry is that it might systematically take 
VR agencies longer to develop IPE for applicants with more severe disabilities, and these are the 
applicants most likely to enter SSD. 
If delay in VR service receipt accelerates (or decelerates) SSD entry, the impact presumably 
would be greatest for applicants who are never served. The direction of the relationship between 
closure without IPE and SSD entry depends on whether SSD entry is measured at closure or 
60 months later. Applicants with closures without an IPE are less likely than all others to have 
entered SSD at closure (3.3 percent versus 6.3 percent) but are more likely than others to have 
entered SSD as of 60 months (13.6 percent versus 12.5 percent). This likely reflects the complex 
mix of cases closed without receiving services—including those determined ineligible because of 
insufficiently severe disabilities and those who decide they cannot pursue employment because 
of the severity of their condition, among others. 
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It is clear that applicant characteristics play a critical role in determining duration to IPE as 
well as SSD entry. Hence, any relationship between duration to IPE for an applicant and the 
likelihood of SSD entry will almost certainly reflect the applicants underlying characteristics. In 
econometric terminology, selection effects likely play a critical role in this relationship. Hence, 
the observed relationship between duration to IPE and SSD entry does not solely reflect the 
effect of duration on SSD entry. 
One approach to addressing selection effects in this context is to create an instrumental 
variable for duration to IPE that affects applicant outcomes only through its effect on duration. If 
one or more such IV is available, an unbiased estimate of the impact of duration to IPE can be 
produced via IV regression.15
The IV for duration to IPE we identified reflects all factors that affect duration to IPE for 
those who initially apply for VR services in the same state and month as the applicant―except 
for the applicant’s own characteristics. It is constructed by first grouping all new applicants in 
the sample period by state and month. To construct the value for an applicant, first remove the 
applicant’s case from the applicant’s state-month group, then order the duration to IPE for the 
remaining applicants from lowest to highest (with “no IPE” at the top), and find the value of 
duration to IPE below which a specified percentage all values lie (a percentile—for example, the 
median). By removing the applicant’s own value for duration to IPE from the sample, we remove 
any effect the applicant’s own characteristics might have on the selected percentile. Hence, the 
selected percentile is determined by factors that affect the duration to IPE for all applicants in the 
same state-month, but not the applicant’s own characteristics. 
 We have identified one important, albeit imperfect, IV candidate 
that can be constructed from the RSA 911 data. 
For a separate study, we experimented with constructing this measure for VR applicants 
who were receiving SSD benefits at the time they applied for VR application, in 2005, except 
that we did not remove the applicant’s own duration to IPE value when finding the relevant 
percentile.16
Use of such an IV for duration to IPE would eliminate the effect of an applicant’s individual 
characteristics on the estimated relationship between duration to IPE and SSD entry, it would not 
eliminate the effect of other factors that might affect duration to IPE for all applicants in a state-
 We initially used the median for the percentile but found that almost one-third of 
applications were in state-month groups with a median of “no IPE”; that is, more the 50 percent 
of the applicants in these state-month groups had their cases closed without an IPE. For our 2002 
sample in Table VII.1, it also seems likely that there would be a large share of state-month 
groups in which more than 50 percent of the applicants had their cases closed without an IPE, as 
43 percent of all applicants in the sample had done so (Table VII.1). Our solution for the 
2005 SSD applicant sample was to use the lower tertile—the percentile below which one-third of 
the values for duration to IPE lie—instead of the median. Although the choice of percentile is 
somewhat arbitrary, choosing a high percentile is problematic because of the large number of 
cases that close without an IPE, and choosing a very low percentile likely will lead to an IV with 
very limited variation—one not very reflective of the variation in factors that affect duration to 
IPE for all applicants in a state-month group. 
                                                 
15 See, for instance, Greene (2012). 
16 See Honeycutt and Stapleton (2012). 
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month group and SSD entry—factors that will be confounded with the effect of waiting time on 
SSD entry in the simple relationship between duration to IPE and SSD entry. Of greatest concern 
is that the business cycle might appreciably affect both the duration to IPE and SSD entry. There 
is strong recent evidence that the business cycle affects SSD entry (Goss 2012). We are not 
aware of any systematic study of the impact of the business cycle on duration to IPE, but there 
are multiple reasons to expect a substantial relationship. 
To illustrate, consider the effects of an economic downturn on VR application and service 
delivery. A downturn is likely to lead to job loss by some workers with disabilities (see 
Kaye 2010), and some of these are likely to seek help from state VR agencies in their efforts to 
return to work. In the absence of a timely capacity expansion, waiting times can be expected to 
increase. This effect would be exacerbated if government fiscal constraints brought on by the 
recession lead to a reduction in resources available to the VR agency. Unless the economy 
recovers very rapidly, the economic downturn is also likely to have an adverse impact on 
employment outcomes for VR clients, increasing the chance they will enter SSD. Hence, the 
business cycle could induce a positive relationship between the IV for duration to IPE and SSD 
entry, contrary to a requirement for an appropriate IV. If so, the IV estimate for the effect of 
duration to IPE on SSD entry would have a positive bias; that is, the estimate would reflect any 
effect of duration to IPE on SSD entry, compounded with a positive component reflecting the 
relationship between duration and SSD entry induced by the business cycle. 
Thus, while the proposed IV likely would address bias due to individual characteristics that 
affect both duration to IPE and SSD entry, it might not be adequate to address bias due to other 
factors at the state-month level that affect both duration to IPE and SSD entry. Given the likely 
substantial effects of the business cycle on both duration to IPE and SSD entry, it is important to 
address the potential bias in some fashion. 
One approach is to include measures for these factors as control variables. State fixed 
effects, the state’s monthly employment rate, and measures of the size of an agency’s fiscal year 
budget relative to the number of applicants over the same period are examples. If the proposed 
IV has no direct effect on SSD entry by VR applicants after controlling for such variables, it 
would be a suitable IV. Unfortunately, there is no way to test for the adequacy of such controls. 
The 2007 recession and subsequent slow recovery might provide an excellent opportunity to 
study how the business cycle affects duration to IPE and SSD entry because of the extensive, 
observable state-level variation in other factors likely to affect both of these variables. It also 
might offer the opportunity to construct an additional IV. As mentioned earlier, we know from 
other research that the recession had a disproportionately large negative impact on employment 
of workers with disabilities and a substantial impact on SSD entry. We also know that the 
severity of the recession varied substantially across states, reflecting the uneven distribution of 
high-risk mortgages around the country among other things. In addition, the federal response 
included substantial new funding for VR services that was distributed unevenly across states, and 
in a manner not highly correlated with the extent of the state’s recession. 
We provide more information in Appendix C and discuss options for using the rich variation 
in the business cycle and VR funding during this period to help isolate the effects of exogenous 
delays in VR services on SSD entry. One important limitation in conducting an analysis for the 
period following the 2007 recession is that data will not be available until several years in the 
future. The RSA 911 data become available about 18 months after the end of the fiscal year. To 
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capture records for all applicants in 2008, it would be necessary to wait for the fiscal year 2013 
data, which likely will not be available until early in 2015. It would be worthwhile to conduct an 
analysis of earlier periods now. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Using matched RSA and SSA data, this study has produced longitudinal statistics on the 
percentage of VR applicants who enter SSD, and the timing of that entry relative to VR 
application. For the most recent annual applicant cohort for which there were data for 60 months 
after application (2003), we found that 6.3 percent of first-time applicants had received an SSD 
award before VR application, that the percentage having entered SSD had approximately 
doubled by VR closure (12.6 percent), and that 17.6 percent had entered SSD as of the 60th 
month following VR application. For earlier cohorts (as early as 1998), the percentage of first-
time applicants having already received an SSD award was lower but grew by approximately the 
same amount over the next 60 months. 
We also produced extensive statistics on how SSD entry varies with the characteristics of 
first-time VR applicants at the time of VR application. This analysis focused on the 2002 cohort, 
again followed for 60 months. Groups with relatively high SSD entry include non-Hispanic 
whites, those not employed at application, those with more than a high school education and, 
especially, those who had entered SSI as of the VR application date. For those in the 2002 cohort 
who entered SSI, 28 percent had also entered SSD as of VR application, 50 percent had entered 
SSD as of VR closure, and 94 percent had entered SSD as of 60 months after VR application. 
We also found wide variation in SSD entry across states; the percentage having entered SSD as 
of 60 months was about 15 percent for several states at the low end but was approximately twice 
as large for several states at the high end. 
We also found that a small share of VR applicants who were not disability insured already 
had entered SSD. It appears that these applicants were either DAC beneficiaries or disability 
insured when they entered SSD but, based on earnings alone, no longer disability insured. 
Finally, we produced statistics on a measure of VR waiting times for applicants in the 2002 
cohort who had not yet entered SSD, and we considered the potential of the data to support an 
evaluation of the impact of waiting time on SSD entry. We measured waiting time as duration 
from application month to IPE and found wide variation in waiting time for the 2002 cohort; 
only 36 percent had an IPE within three months of application, another 10 percent had an IPE 
within six months, and 43 percent closed without an IPE (including those found ineligible for 
services). We also found a positive relationship between duration to IPE and entry into SSD, but 
there are many possible explanations of this relationship in addition to the effect of waiting time 
on SSD entry. We have described an approach to estimation of the impact of waiting time on 
SSD entry and other outcomes designed to eliminate bias from the confounding effects of 
unobserved individual applicant characteristics on waiting times and outcomes, as well as an 
approach that reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, the confounding effects of factors 
pertinent to all applicants in a given state and month—most notably, the strength of the economy 
and the size of the VR agency’s federal grant. 
Our results show that VR agencies are already offering what might reasonably be called 
early intervention services to substantial numbers of potential SSD entrants in each year. For the 
2003 cohort of new VR applicants, 50,829 entered SSD after VR application. Although this is a 
large number, it is modest by comparison to the total of 829,831 individuals who received SSD 
awards in 2003 (SSA 2004). Of course, we do not know whether VR services helped these 
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individuals delay or hasten SSD entry, nor do we know how services affected SSD entry for 
those who had not entered as of 60 months after application. 
Despite the likely small size of any current impact of VR services on SSD entry relative to 
the number of SSD entrants, the impact on SSD and Medicare expenditures could be in the 
billions of dollars annually. Based on 2003 benefit amounts, a new beneficiary in 2003 who 
received the average benefit amount for new beneficiaries every month for 10 years would 
receive total benefits of about $108,000.17 Medicare benefits, which start after 24 months, would 
be on the order of $65,000 per year, based on comparison of Medicare expenditures for all 
under-65 enrollees and total SSD benefit expenditures.18
In the current policy environment, the potential for VR services to reduce or delay SSD 
entry is perhaps much more important than the extent to which VR services currently delay or 
accelerate SSD entry. As discussed earlier, under current policy there are incentives for VR 
agencies to help their applicants enter SSD; doing so may increase the chance that SSA will pay 
for services provided and reduce the cost of Medicaid to the state. Changes in these incentives 
might reduce SSD entry by VR applicants. Perhaps a more aggressive effort to have VR agencies 
help workers with disabilities stay in the labor force rather than enter SSD would also pay for 
itself through reduced SSD and Medicare expenditures, although there is no guarantee. Increases 
in federal funding for VR services tied to VR outreach efforts to workers who experience 
disability onset before they lose their jobs, perhaps via their employers (following the Alabama 
model), or tied to other approaches for targeting workers who might otherwise enter SSD, have 
the potential to pay for themselves through SSD and Medicare savings. SSA once developed a 
plan to conduct a test of early intervention services provided by state VR agencies as part of a 
broader early intervention test (Berkowitz 2002), but that plan was not pursued. Our findings 
suggest that such a test deserves further consideration. 
 Combined, SSD and Medicare 
expenditures for the average awardee over 10 years are on the order of $173,000. If VR services 
in each year increase/decrease SSD entry by the equivalent of 10,000 individuals for an average 
period of 10 years, the size of the impact on SSD and Medicare expenditures combined would be 
on the order of $1.7 billion. Of course, there might be effects on expenditures for other programs 
(notably Medicaid and SSI), as well as tax revenues, that would increase or decrease this amount. 
By comparison, federal expenditures for VR services in fiscal year 2008 were $3.1 billion 
(Appendix C). 
                                                 
17 The mean monthly benefit for new awardees in 2003 was $897.45. The $100,000 figure is based on 
10 x 12 x $897.15 = $107,658 (SSA 2004, Table 2). These amounts do not include a relatively small average benefit 
amount for beneficiary dependents. 
18 Livermore et al. (2011) report SSD expenditures totaling $103,762 million (exclusive of benefits for non-
disabled dependents), and $62,920 million in Medicare expenditures for those under age 65 (all SSDI beneficiaries, 
except a very small share who are eligible because of end-stage renal disease) for fiscal year 2008. The Medicare 
figure is 60.64 percent of the SSD figure. We multiplied the SSD benefit expenditure estimate in the previous 
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Table A.1. Demographic Characteristics of 2002 VR Applicants Who Had Received an SSD Award 
as of Application but Were Not Disability Insured 
 Number Percent 
All Applicants 46,348 100.0% 
Age   
Under 18 1  0.0% 
18-25 18,770 40.5% 
26-29 4,179  9.0% 
30-39 8,410  18.1% 
40-49 8,415  18.2% 
50-59 5,243  11.3% 
60-FRA 1,330  2.9% 
Gender   
Male 24,305  52.4% 
Female 22,043  47.6% 
Sources: RSA 911 2002, MEF and TRF. 
Table A.2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of 2002 VR Applicants Who Had Received an SSD 
Award as of Application but Were Not Disability Insured 
 Number Percent 
All Applicants 46,348 100.0% 
SSDI Status   
Pre-award 0 0.0% 
Current pay 37,693  81.3% 
STW 471  1.0% 
Other S/T 8,184  17.7% 
Employed at Time of VR Application   
Employed 2,724  5.9% 
Not employed 41,859  90.3% 
Missing 1,765  3.8% 
Highest Education Level at VR Application   
8th grade or less 1,717  3.7% 
9th-12th grade, no diploma 11,481  24.8% 
Special-education certificate 5,472  11.8% 
High school graduate or GED 16,881  36.4% 
Post-secondary education 10,585  22.8% 
Missing 212   0.5%  
Sources: RSA 911, MEF and TRF. 
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Table A.3. Health and Disability Characteristics of 2002 VR Applicants Who Had Received an SSD 
Award as of Application but Were Not Disability Insured 
 Number Percent 
All Applicants 46,348 100.0% 
VR Disability Status   
No impairment 323  0.7% 
Blindness 1,155  2.5% 
Other visual impairment 542  1.2% 
Deafness, primary communication visual 494  1.1% 
Deafness, primary communication auditory 77  0.2% 
Hearing loss, primary communication visual 93  0.2% 
Hearing loss, primary communication auditory 183  0.4% 
Other hearing impairments 21  0.0% 
Deaf-blindness 22  0.0% 
Communicative impairments 200  0.4% 
Mobility orthopedic/neurological impairments 2,567  5.5% 
Manipulation/dexterity orthopedic/neurological impairments 786  1.7% 
Both mobility and manipulation/dexterity orthopedic/neurological impairments 2,106  4.5% 
Other orthopedic impairments 1,897  4.1% 
Respiratory impairments 352  0.8% 
General physical debilitation 1,510  3.3% 
Other physical impairments 3,410  7.4% 
Intellectual/cognitive impairments 10,021  21.6% 
Psychosocial impairments 10,494  22.6% 
Other mental impairments 3,167  6.8% 
Missing 6,928  14.9% 
SSA Primary Disabling Condition Group   
Major affective disorders 8,420  18.2% 
Other psychiatric disorders 10,337  22.3% 
Intellectual/cognitive disorders 8,815  19.0% 
Back disorders 2,486  5.4% 
Musculoskeletal system 1,814  3.9% 
Other physical disabilities 12,822  27.7% 
Missing 1,654  3.6% 
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Table B.1. Percentage of the 2002 New VR Applicant Cohort Ever Awarded SSD at Application, 









to 60 Months At Close At 60 Months 
Alabama 4% 5% 6% 8% 15% 
Alaska 5% 5% 8% 10% 18% 
American Samoa 14% 7% 5% 21% 26% 
Arizona 10% 7% 7% 17% 23% 
Arkansas 6% 5% 8% 11% 19% 
California 7% 5% 6% 12% 18% 
Colorado 6% 5% 8% 10% 18% 
Connecticut 11% 6% 9% 17% 25% 
Delaware 8% 5% 10% 13% 23% 
District of Columbia 5% 4% 4% 9% 13% 
Florida 6% 3% 8% 9% 17% 
Georgia 5% 4% 7% 9% 16% 
Guam 2% 12% 8% 14% 22% 
Hawaii 6% 6% 3% 12% 15% 
Idaho 5% 5% 9% 10% 19% 
Illinois 8% 5% 7% 12% 19% 
Indiana 6% 6% 10% 12% 21% 
Iowa 5% 5% 6% 11% 16% 
Kansas 7% 5% 10% 12% 22% 
Kentucky 5% 6% 7% 10% 18% 
Louisiana 7% 4% 6% 11% 17% 
Maine 8% 11% 8% 19% 27% 
Maryland 7% 5% 8% 11% 20% 
Massachusetts 11% 10% 6% 21% 28% 
Michigan 5% 5% 7% 10% 17% 
Minnesota 8% 8% 9% 16% 25% 
Mississippi 3% 4% 8% 7% 16% 
Missouri 5% 4% 9% 9% 18% 
Montana 4% 5% 9% 10% 19% 
Nebraska 6% 4% 11% 9% 20% 
Nevada 7% 4% 9% 12% 21% 
New Hampshire 8% 9% 10% 17% 28% 
New Jersey 7% 5% 8% 12% 20% 
New Mexico 5% 5% 12% 10% 22% 
New York 6% 3% 6% 9% 15% 
North Carolina 4% 4% 9% 8% 17% 
North Dakota 3% 5% 7% 9% 15% 
Northern Marianas 2% 2% 2% 4% 6% 
Ohio 6% 4% 10% 9% 19% 
Oklahoma 4% 5% 6% 9% 15% 
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Oregon 6% 3% 10% 9% 19% 
Pennsylvania 6% 7% 6% 14% 20% 
Puerto Rico 5% 2% 3% 7% 10% 
Rhode Island 10% 7% 6% 17% 23% 
South Carolina 3% 3% 6% 6% 12% 
South Dakota 6% 6% 8% 12% 20% 
Tennessee 6% 5% 5% 11% 16% 
Texas 3% 3% 7% 6% 14% 
Utah 3% 5% 5% 8% 13% 
Vermont 7% 7% 10% 14% 24% 
Virgin Islands 2% 2% 5% 5% 9% 
Virginia 6% 6% 8% 12% 20% 
Washington 7% 6% 10% 13% 23% 
West Virginia 4% 4% 6% 8% 14% 
Wisconsin 7% 7% 10% 14% 24% 
Wyoming 4% 5% 8% 9% 17% 
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As discussed in Section VII, the 2007–2009 recession and its effects on VR funding might 
offer an opportunity to isolate the impact of delays in VR service delivery on SSD entry. This is 
because the recession induced rich exogenous variation in two other factors that seem likely to 
affect both variables—employer demand for labor and VR funding. State-level statistics on 
employment during this period are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other 
sources. Here, we focus on the harder-to-find information on VR funding. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) included $540 million in grant 
funds for VR agencies to be spent in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, waiving the usual state match. 
Table C.1 shows the (fiscal year) 2008 initial allocation to each state, ARRA funding for each 
state, and actual allocations for 2009 through 2011, in millions. The total ARRA allocation was 
approximately 20 percent of the 2008 allocation, distributed equally across states. Although the 
funding was motivated by the severe recession, the allocation reflected the formula historically 
used to allocate federal funding, and did not reflect the severity of the recession or the shortfall 
of available funds in individual states. Hence, we would expect the correlation between changes 
in labor market measures and changes in funding to be modest, at most. 
Despite the ARRA allocation mechanism, some states took much greater advantage of the 
ARRA funding than others, leading to widely disparate increases in funding in 2009 and, 
especially, 2010 and 2011, relative to the 2008 allocation. This disparity occurred because some 
states did not use all of their allocations, and in some cases because state matching funds were 
not available for their base grants; other states were able to obtain the unused funds. In 2010, 
West Virginia experienced a doubling of its grant funding relative to its 2008 allocation. 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont each experienced an increase of more 
than 50 percent relative to the 2008 allocation in at least one year, and Arkansas and Hawaii each 
experienced an increase of at least 25 percent in at least one year. Nine states received less than 
their 2008 allocation in at least one year (Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming). These patterns likely reflect how the 
severity of the recession in a particular state affected its ability to pay its share, but no doubt 
many other considerations played a role. 
The extensive variation in the recession and increases in federal funding for VR services 
observed over this period should facilitate efforts to isolate the effect of exogenous changes in 
duration to IPE on SSD entry from the effects of other factors that might be correlated with that 
both. For instance, a future researcher could use VR applicant cohorts for 2007 and 2008 to 
estimate a linear probability model for SSD entry as of a fixed number of months after 
application (for example, 36), as a function of duration to IPE (using the IV for duration to IPE 
described earlier) and control variables for individual characteristics observed in the RSA 911 
data. In addition, a researcher possibly could use multiple state-month-level variables to describe 
the state of the labor market over the observation period (that is, from the application month 
through the fixed number of months used in the specification). The large amount of variation in 
the economy over this period likely would support a fairly rich specification. 
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Alabama 10 56 61 60 59 18% 109% 107% 106% 
Alaska 2 9 10 11 12 19% 108% 118% 123% 
Arizona 13 58 61 64 65 23% 106% 111% 112% 
Arkansas 7 36 40 44 46 18% 110% 123% 128% 
California 56 276 285 290 289 20% 103% 105% 105% 
Colorado 7 36 38 40 40 20% 105% 111% 112% 
Connecticut 3 20 23 31 24 17% 117% 156% 121% 
Delaware 2 9 11 11 10 19% 117% 114% 110% 
District of Columbia 2 13 13 13 15 15% 103% 106% 118% 
Florida 32 153 159 159 156 21% 104% 104% 102% 
Georgia 19 92 76 77 65 20% 83% 83% 70% 
Hawaii 2 11 13 15 13 20% 117% 133% 117% 
Idaho 3 16 16 16 15 21% 101% 100% 98% 
Illinois 20 105 113 118 115 19% 108% 112% 109% 
Indiana 12 67 69 63 64 19% 103% 94% 96% 
Iowa 6 31 32 27 26 18% 103% 88% 84% 
Kansas 5 27 28 29 29 19% 103% 108% 108% 
Kentucky 9 52 53 47 46 18% 103% 91% 89% 
Louisiana 10 56 33 31 33 18% 59% 56% 59% 
Maine 3 15 16 17 16 17% 105% 111% 110% 
Maryland 7 38 46 47 47 18% 120% 123% 124% 
Massachusetts 7 46 53 67 69 16% 117% 147% 151% 
Michigan 18 97 100 102 99 19% 103% 105% 101% 
Minnesota 8 43 45 47 47 18% 104% 109% 110% 
Mississippi 7 41 43 45 44 17% 105% 108% 108% 
Missouri 11 62 65 63 65 18% 104% 101% 105% 
Montana 2 11 12 12 12 19% 109% 112% 109% 
Nebraska 3 17 19 20 20 18% 110% 114% 115% 
Nevada 4 18 10 17 19 24% 57% 97% 104% 
New Hampshire 2 11 12 12 12 18% 113% 109% 112% 
New Jersey 9 55 59 59 58 17% 107% 108% 104% 
New Mexico 4 23 24 24 22 20% 106% 106% 97% 
New York 26 147 156 177 169 17% 106% 120% 115% 
North Carolina 18 93 97 107 103 19% 105% 115% 112% 
North Dakota 2 9 10 10 10 19% 104% 107% 107% 
Ohio 22 120 121 99 106 18% 101% 82% 88% 
Oklahoma 8 41 42 41 43 19% 104% 101% 107% 
Oregon 7 35 44 39 39 20% 125% 111% 111% 
Pennsylvania 21 121 124 129 99 17% 103% 106% 82% 
Rhode Island 2 10 11 13 16 17% 106% 129% 159% 
South Carolina 10 51 54 55 50 19% 106% 109% 98% 
South Dakota 2 9 10 10 10 19% 106% 107% 107% 
Tennessee 12 66 68 73 73 19% 104% 111% 111% 
Texas 45 218 227 236 234 21% 104% 108% 108% 
Utah 6 28 32 38 38 21% 113% 134% 135% 
Vermont 2 9 10 13 15 19% 109% 140% 157% 
Virginia 12 62 67 71 73 19% 108% 115% 118% 
Washington 10 51 53 52 54 20% 104% 102% 105% 
West Virginia 4 25 26 55 48 17% 102% 216% 189% 
Wisconsin 10 55 57 56 57 18% 103% 101% 103% 
Wyoming 2 9 9 9 9 19% 93% 94% 94% 
Total 540 2,761 2,975 3,085 3,085 20% 108% 112% 112% 
Sources: Values in first five columns are millions of dollars, not inflation adjusted. 2008 allotment is from GAO (2010). 
Remaining figures are from on-line tables available from the U.S. Department of Education at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/index.html, accessed July 15, 2012. Percentages in 
the last four columns were calculated by the authors from the values in the first five columns. 
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Researchers could also use ARRA-induced changes in federal funding for VR services as an 
additional IV. These changes presumably had an effect on duration to IPE. It is possible that they 
are correlated with the strength of the state’s economy, but the effect of the latter presumably 
will be captured by the state-month variables for the strength of the economy. That is, 
conditional on the variables for the state of the economy, changes in VR funding presumably 
affect SSD entry for VR applicants only through their effect on duration to IPE. It is also 
possible, however, that changes in VR funding have effects on the quantity or quality of services 
received beyond the effect on duration to IPE, and those effects might also affect SSD entry. 
Hence, a reasonable alternative to using the VR funding variable as an additional IV is to use it 
as an additional control variable. One weakness of any VR funding variable is that it will vary 
across fiscal years and states only; there will be no monthly variation within years. 
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As noted in the research design of this study, the variables used come from three 
sources―the RSA 911, the TRF, and the MEF. They are either taken directly from the data sets 
or constructed from variables available in the data sets. Table D.1 provides names and 
descriptions of these variables. 
Table D.1. Variables Used in Study 
Variable Description 
SSD Program-Related Variables 
DI insured date • This variable indicates the date an individual achieves 
disability-insured status. It is derived from MEF, using an 
algorithm provided by SSA. 
Date of SSDI entitlement • This variable is taken from the TRF. It indicates the date of 
SSDI entitlement.  
Date of SSDI award • This variable is taken from the TRF. It indicates the DI 
award date for each beneficiary.   
SSDI at time of VR application • This variable indicates SSDI status at time of VR 
application [SSDI = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. It is constructed using 
the RSA 911 and TRF. 
SSDI at or before time of VR 
application 
• This variable indicates SSDI status at time of VR 
application [SSDI = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. It is constructed using 
the RSA 911 and TRF. 
SSDI at time of VR case closure • This variable indicates SSDI status at time of VR closure 
[SSDI = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. It is constructed using the RSA 911 
and TRF. 
Date of SSI entitlement • This variable is taken from the TRF. It indicates the date of 
SSI entitlement.  
Date of SSI award • This variable is taken from the TRF. It indicates the SSI 
award date for each beneficiary.   
SSI at time of VR application • This variable indicates SSI status at time of VR application 
[SSI = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. It is constructed using the RSA 911 
and TRF. 
SSI at time of VR closure • This variable indicates SSI status at time of VR closure [SSI 
= 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. It is constructed using the RSA 911 and 
TRF. 
Months from VR application to SSDI 
entitlement  
• This variable is constructed using the RSA 911 and the 
TRF to indicate the number of months between month of 
VR application and month of SSDI entitlement or award.  
DAC at time of VR Application • This variable indicates disabled adult child beneficiary 
status in December 2009 or as of the beneficiary’s last 
month on the rolls if earlier. 
DWB at time of VR application • This variable indicates disabled widow(er) beneficiary 
status in December 2009 or as of the beneficiary’s last 
month on the rolls if earlier. 
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VR Program-Related Variables 
State VR agency • State VR agency to which a client applies for services. Prior 
to 2002, the RSA agency variable was a 2-position field; 
starting in 2002, it was changed to a 3-position field for 
general VR agencies and blind services. We created a 
common designation and assigned a value label for each 
state (e.g., Alabama = 1, Alaska = 2, etc.). 
VR application date • As noted in the research design, our annual cohorts consist 
of first-time VR applicants. An individual may have multiple 
VR application dates, however. This variable is taken from 
the RSA 911 and used to indicate the client’s first VR 
application date, if there is no record of a previous case 
closure.   
Previous VR closure • This variable is used to exclude clients with multiple VR 
applications from inclusion in more than one cohort. 
VR eligibility • This variable indicates date of VR eligibility. 
Number of months from VR application 
to IPE 
• This variable is constructed using the RSA 911 to indicate 
the number of months between a client’s VR application 
and signed IPE. 
VR closure date • This variable establishes the client’s first VR case closure 
date. 
Sociodemographic Variables 
Age • Age in years at time of VR application is based on RSA 
date of birth data, validated with the NUMIDENT. Dates of 
births that do not match are excluded from the analysis. 
Gender • Gender is determined by RSA data validated with the 
NUMIDENT. 
Race or ethnicity • This variable describes racial or ethnic categories.  
− American Indian or Alaska Native 
− Asian 
− Black  
− Hispanic 
− Native Hawaiian or Pacific Island American 
− White  
− Multiple Race/Ethnicity 
Highest education level at VR 
application 
• This variable is taken from the RSA 911. Education levels 
reported include the following:  
− No formal education  
− 8th grade or less 
− Grades 9–12, no diploma 
− Special education certificate 
− High school graduate or GED 
− Postsecondary education, no degree 
− Associate’s degree or vocational/technical certification 
− Bachelor’s degree 
− Master’s degree or higher 
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Highest education level at closure • This variable is taken from the RSA 911. Education levels 
reported include the following:  
− No formal education 
− 8th grade or less 
− Grades 9–12, no diploma 
− Special education certificate 
− High school graduate or GED 
− Postsecondary education, no degree 
− Associate’s degree or vocational/technical certification 
− Bachelor’s degree 
− Master’s degree or higher 
Employment status at VR application • Employed at time of VR application is defined as 
employment with or without supports, unpaid family worker, 
homemaker, or self-employment. 
Disability and Impairment Status Variables 
VR Primary disability area of 
impairment 
• This variable, taken from the RSA 911, indicates primary 
disability area of impairment. There are 19 categories for 
area of impairment: 
1. Blindness 
2. Other Visual Impairment 
3. Deafness, Primary Communication Visual 
4. Deafness, Primary Communication Auditory 
5. Hearing Loss, Primary Communication Visual 
6. Hearing Loss, Primary Communication Auditory 
7. Other Hearing Impairments 
8. Deaf-Blindness 
9. Communicative Impairments 
10. Mobility Orthopedic/Neurological Impairments 
11. Manipulation/Dexterity Orthopedic/Neurological 
Impairments 
12. Both Mobility and Manipulation/Dexterity 
Orthopedic/Neurological Impairments 
13. Other Orthopedic Impairments 
14. Respiratory Impairments 
15. General Physical Debilitation 
16. Other Physical Impairments 
17. Cognitive Impairments 
18. Psychosocial Impairments 
19. Other Mental Impairments 
SSA Primary Disabling Condition 
Group  
• This variable is constructed from the TRF. It indicates 
seven categories for disability group. 
1. Major Affective Disorders 
2. Other Psychiatric Disorders 
3. Intellectual Disability 
4. Back Disorders 
5. Musculoskeletal System 
6. Other Physical Disabilities 
7. Missing 
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Sources of Support Variables 
TANF at time of VR application • This variable indicates TANF status at time of VR 
application [TANF = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. 
TANF at time of VR closure • This variable indicates TANF status at time of VR closure 
[TANF = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. 
General assistance (GA) at time of VR 
application 
• This variable indicates GA (state or local government) 
status at time of VR application [GA = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. 
General assistance at time of VR 
closure  
• This variable indicates GA (state or local government) 
status at time of VR closure [GA = 0 (no), 1 (yes)]. 
Veterans’ disability benefits at time of 
VR application 
• This variable indicates Veterans Administration benefits 
status at time of VR application [VA = 0 (no), 1 (yes)].  
Veterans’ disability benefits at VR 
closure 
• VA benefits status at time of VR closure [VA = 0 (no), 1 
(yes)].  
Workers’ compensation at time of VR 
application 
• This variable is used for the 2002 cohort. It indicates 
workers’ compensation support at time of VR application 
[WC = 0 (no), 1 (yes)].  
Workers’ compensation at time of VR 
closure 
• This variable is used for the 2002 cohort. It indicates 
workers’ compensation support at time of VR case closure 
[WC = 0 (no), 1 (yes)].  
Other public support at time of VR 
application 
• This variable is used for the 2002 cohort. It indicates other 
supports at time of VR application [Other = 0 (no), 1 (yes)].  
Other public support at time of VR 
case closure 
• This variable is used for the 2002 cohort. It indicates other 
supports at time of VR closure [Other = 0 (no), 1 (yes)].  
 
